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ABSTRACT
Digital Right Management (DRM) is a technology developed to
prevent illegal reproduction and distribution of digital contents.
It protects the rights of content owners by allowing only autho-
rised consumers to legitimately access associated digital content.
DRM systems typically use a consumer’s identity for authentication.
In addition, some DRM systems collect consumer’s preferences to
obtain a content license. Thus, the behaviour of DRM systems disad-
vantages the digital content consumers (i.e. neglecting consumers’
privacy) focusing more on securing the digital content (i.e. biased to-
wards content owners). This paper proposes the Privacy-Preserving
Digital Rights Management System (PrivDRM) that allows a con-
sumer to acquire digital content with its license without disclosing
complete personal information and without using any third parties.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed solution, a prototype
of the PrivDRM system has been developed and investigated. The
security analysis (attacks and threats) are analysed and showed
that PrivDRM supports countermeasures for well-known attacks
and achieving the privacy requirements. In addition, a comparison
with some well-known proposals shows that PrivDRM outperforms
those proposals in terms of processing overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections; Digital rights
management; Authorization; Privacy-preserving protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of technology, digital multimedia have
been under scrutiny from both consumer’s and content creator’s
point of views. The ease of access to such digital content facilitates
illegal content sharing, which enables unauthorised consumers to
access such content illegally and without being identified. For exam-
ple, many users utilising Peer-to-Peer applications such as Vuze and
µTorrent infringe copy-righted materials on a daily basis. In some
countries such as China, protecting digital rights is challenging[1].
Although Creative Commons licenses promise seamless responsible
sharing of academic content amongst legitimate users, it is hard
to protect against illegal access [17]. That endures a considerable
revenue loss for the content owners as discussed byWu et al. in [31].
The content owners and legal distributors protect their intellectual
property and commercial profits by using DRM systems. DRM is a
technology developed to prevent illegal reproduction and distribu-
tion of digital content. It protects the rights of the content owners
by allowing only authorised consumers to legitimately access the
content. Unfortunately, those DRM systems, sometimes, ignore or
overlook the privacy preferences of the consumers focusing more
on protecting the content, which is in the favour of the content
owner. This biased behaviour of DRM systems disadvantages the
digital content consumers and could render them vulnerable to
many security attacks should the system is compromised by mali-
cious parties [2, 12].
The issue of digital privacy is becoming increasingly prevalent in
a world where more people are connecting to the Internet than ever
before [13], where there is a tendency to access and share informa-
tion, for example, in both inside and outside the traditional working
environment on popular social networking sites [26]. While numer-
ous survey studies reveal the users’ growing sensitivity towards
digital privacy, some users are still privacy pragmatic [16]. In many
aspects of privacy, studies show that people are prepared, in certain
situations, to essentially trade-out aspects of their own privacy for
a sense of increased accessibility, security, and safety in their daily
activities [8]. While this approach certainly draws criticism [6], it
is, unfortunately, a reality. While there is no definitive definition
of what constitutes ’personal data’, there is a dire requirement to
protect digital users against the activities that could compromise
their privacy. In this research, we adopt the latest General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) definition of personal data which
describes personal data as "Any information relating to a directly or
indirectly identified or identifiable natural person (’data subject’)".
1. Indirect identification is an important aspect of this definition as,
1http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/article-4-definitions-GDPR.htm
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for example, building a profile of a user could disclose the user’s
identity. Building a user profile is easy in multimedia and could
reveal lots of information about the person [5]. Given the afore-
mentioned predicament of the DRM systems’ bias and the need for
protecting consumer’s privacy, we, in this paper, aim at proposing
a novel DRM system (i.e. PrivDRM) that preserves the consumers’
privacy, while maintaining the content owner’s protection of the
digital content. Unlike solutions such as EDU-DRM which is target-
ing K-12 Education [22], PrivDRM is a generic solution that caters
to a wide spectrum of application requirements. In PrivDRM, a
consumer acquires a digital content without disclosing complete
personal information, thus protecting the consumer’s privacy and
preventing any collusion from the DRM parties. However, PrivDRM,
at some point, can identify illegal consumers those manipulating
the system to hold them accountable.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses
the background and related works. Section 3 demonstrates the
proposed system along with its notation and building blocks. Sec-
tion 4 investigates the proposal and analyses it. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper and depicts the future research direction(s).
2 BACKGROUND
Privacy-preserving DRM schemes for multiparty distributor have
been around in the academic literature for a while. For example,
Win et al. [30] proposed a privacy-preserving scheme for multiparty
DRM systems without relying on a Trusted Third Party (TTP). It
uses simple cryptographic primitives such as blind decryption and
hash chain to avoid TTP and to protect the consumer’s privacy. In
this system, the consumer obtains the token set from the content
owner anonymously to purchase a license of content from a content
provider. A drawback here is that the content provider is able to
track the content usage of the consumer, thus can build a usage
profile under a pseudonym. Petrlic et al. (2013) in [23] proposed
a privacy-preserving multiparty DRM system based on the smart-
card technology without using a TTP for license checking. It is
based on proxy re-encryption to protect the consumer’s privacy
and to avoid using TTP. Consumer’s anonymity is preserved, where
neither the content providers nor the content distributors are able to
obtain any information about the consumer. However, this system
does not address how malicious consumers could be identified!
Mishra et al. (2012) proposed a privacy-preserving multiparty
DRM system in [21] that is based on the secret sharing scheme,
where no party has the complete decryption key. In this system, the
distributor plays the middle-man role that exchanges the messages
between the owner and the consumer. Consumer’s anonymity is
preserved during the license acquisition process without violating
the accountability requirement, which seems a promising technique.
However, the computational overhead endured by the system is
significantly high that affects its adoption, for example, in mobile
computing. The work in [21] preserves the anonymity of the con-
sumer by the utilisation of TTPwhich we believe is time-consuming
and could be (i.e. TTP) taken off the system as found in the other
proposals. The work in [23] does not trace malicious attempts to
access protected digital content, which could encourage other unau-
thorised and malicious users to attempt accessing more content.
Unfortunately, the work in [20] does not protect against collisions
of DRM servers and partially providing non-repudiation (i.e. non-
repudiation is provided for some system processes only), which
is the same drawback of the work in [30]. Unlinkability is overly
important as it prevents any party from building a profile of the
consumer, which is not supported in those systems except that of
[23]. Preventing any part from building a usage profile to identify a
user is of paramount importance as highlighted ealier. Mishra et al.
(2015) in [20] proposed another scheme that presents a flexible and
transparent content distribution mechanism based on sharing the
content key information between the distributor and the license
server. Such a content license can not be generated without the par-
ticipation of both parties. In this system, the owner assigns all keys
ki by pseudonym unique keyUki and sends the pair (ki ,Uki ) to the
license server via an ’assumed’ secure channel. Such an assumption
is one of the drawbacks of this work. The license server identifies
key ki byUki , where the key ki is used for encryption/decryption.
In addition, the owner provides the name mapping process between
pseudonym keys’ identities and contents’ identities to all distribu-
tors via the ’secure’ channel. This scheme protects the consumer’s
privacy, where the distributor and the license server know who
requested the content, but not the content itself. The work provides
anonymous content identity in this way hiding the consumer’s pref-
erence, which is one aspect of the consumer’s privacy. In addition, it
supports accountability in case of a consumer maliciously accessing
the protected content. The identification of malicious consumers
is achieved without violating the privacy of authorised consumers.
Computationally, the process of signing the pseudo keys exhibits
a significant overhead that many devices such as low-end smart-
phones may not be able to endure, not to mention the time it takes
for such pseudonym keys generation. Moreover, the owner not only
send these pseudo keys to the license server but also send them to
the distributor through name mapping process that increases the
number of communicated messages in the system, not to mention
the infrastructure needed at multiple parties to securely store those
keys.
The concept for decentralised rightsmanagement has been around
for a while and the work in [11] discusses the possibility of using
blockchain as the decentralisation technology. The need for de-
centralisation is to solve the problems arising from centralised
solutions even those using P2P Based DRM Scheme such as leaking
the protected content if the centralised server is compromised [28].
As blockchain is becoming prolific in many application domains,
DRM could also benefit from such a technology especially in sup-
porting anonymity. The work in [19] proposes DRMChain which is
a scheme to manage digital rights based on blockchain. Under this
umbrella comes the workpieces in [9, 14, 15, 19, 24, 32, 33]. While
blockchain promises Transparency, Redundancy, Immutability, and
Dis-inter-mediation, it faces challenges such as where the actual
digital content is going to be stored [25]. In addition, while im-
mutability is a required feature, disputes over copyright are always
expected, thus how such disputes are resolved in the existence of
immutability! For more information about what blockchain can and
can’t do, we suggest the reader go through the work in [4, 10, 25, 27].
It is worth noting that a recent trend in DRM privacy is to use quan-
tum computing and deep learning models as that in the work in
[3, 7, 29].
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To summarise the differences between existing DRM systems
and to show what is missing, we compiled Table 1 for that purpose.
Table 1: Existing DRM Solutions Comparison
Feature [30] [23] [21] [20] [19] [15] [32]
Consumer
anonymity
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTP Utilisation No No Yes No No No No
Malicious attempts
Tracking
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No N/A
License acquisition
privacy
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Servers Collision
Protection
No No Yes Yes N/A N/A No
unlinkability* No Yes No ++ No ++ No No No
Non-repudiation No Yes No* No* No No No
Content distributor
Flexibility
Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A No
• Unlinkability of the content execution.
• No++: If parties colluded, content is linkable otherwise, it is
not.
• No*, the system partially achieves non-repudiation in some
processes
Given Table1, there is a need for a solution that provides con-
sumer’s anonymity and privacy-preserving, which includes the sup-
port of the unlinkability of content execution, does not depend on
TTP or any additional trusted hardware, provides non-repudiation
and flexibility to choose the content distributor, and finally provides
Tracking of malicious attempts. For such a purpose, we will intro-
duce our system that provides those features in the next section.
3 THE PROPOSED PRIVDRM SYSTEM
3.1 Notation and Assumptions
The proposed system depends on the following notation:
• consumer C , content owner O , distributor D, license server
LS , and multiple levels of distributors(Di, j )
• For any entity in the system i , it’s identity IDi , its public key
is PKi and its private key is Ski
• H (X ): A cryptographic one-way hash function
• EPKi : Public-key encryption algorithm using entity i’s public
key
• EsymK : Symmetric-key encryption algorithm using symmet-
ric key K
• siдnSKi Digital signature algorithm using entity i’s private
key
PrivDRM assumes the system has multiple distributors, where
the deployment of distributors depends on the system requirements,
the distributor can securely authenticate different consumers and
each entity in the system has a public/private key pair, and the
consumers can use anonymous networks such as TOR2 to access
the protected content.
2https://www.torproject.org/
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Figure 1: PrivDRM: An Overview
3.2 The Building Blocks
The proposed system building blocks are depicted in figure 1.
Content Encryption. Let the systemhaven distributors (i.e.D1...n )
and r digital contents (i.e.M1,M2, ...,Mr ) each of which with a dif-
ferent content identity IDMi (i.e. IDM1 , IDM2 , ..., IDMr ). To secure
the digital contents, the system encrypts them in the following
manner:
• Esymki (Mi ), i = 1, 2, .., r
O generates distinct symmetric keys K1,K2, ..Kr and sym-
metrically encrypts all digital contents (i.e in our PrivDRM
implementation, we used the AES algorithm).
• H (IDM1 ),H (IDM2 ), ...,H (IDMr )
O hashes the content identities and keeps the hashed values
of the content identities securely stored.
• Finally, O sends ( protected contents, contents information)
to all Dn and the pair of (Ki ,H (IDMi )) to LS via a secure
communication channel (i.e. in PrivDRM implementation,
we used TOR). LS identifies the content decryption key Ki
by the hash value of content identity H (IDMi ) instead of
original content identity (IDMi ).
Content Distribution. Each distributor Di is assumed to store the
protected contents while sharing content data (i.e. on their website
for example). The content data could includes the content name,
the price, the content description, and the content ID (IDMt )). Cj
can download the protected content from any distributor (i.e. could
be based on server proximity or price preference). Cj can use a Tor
connection to connect to the distributor’s storage/website. In this
way, c j can anonymously.
License Acquisition Process. For a consumerCi to buy a license Lt
for a protected contentMt , Ci must go through an authentication
process with the distributor. If the authentication process such as
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that mentioned in [18] 3 is done successfully, the license acquisition
protocol follows as:
• Ci computes H (IDMt ) then encapsulate that in the license
request to Dд .
• Dд verifies the consumer’s registration and checks its revoca-
tion list to checkwhether the consumer is a revoked/authorized
consumer.
• If the verification is successful, Dд receives the payment
from the authorized consumer then generates T , where T
= (IDC , H (IDMt ), TS1 ), where TS1 is the timestamp of the
transaction.
• Dд encrypts T using LS’ public key and sign the message
using own private key to get X = EPKLS (T ) and σ (X ) =
siдnSKDд (X ). After that, Dд sends (X ,σX ) to LS .
• LS verifies the signature of Dд using its public key. If verifi-
cation succeeds, LS decrypts T using own private key. The
hashed content identity H (IDMt ) and the consumer’s iden-
tity IDC are extracted from the T .
• LS generates the license Lt which includes the content us-
age rights, timestamp TS2 , and the decryption key Kt that is
identified by H (IDMt ). Then, LS associates the encrypted
consumer’s identity EPKLS (IDC ) with the license.
• LS , then, encrypts the license usingCi ’s public key, generates
its signature using own private key, and sends the signed
message to Ci .
• On receiving the messages from LS , Ci verifies its signature
using LS’s public key. If verification succeeds, Ci decrypts
the message using own private key to extract the license to
play the protected content.
Revocation Detection of Consumer. In a DRM system, consumers
must be accountable for any misuse of their purchased licenses.
Thus, the consumer must be authenticated and his/her usage license
data will be tracked via license acquisition. If the license is associ-
ated with the original identity of the consumer, the license usage
data may disclose information about consumer’s preferences. Thus,
the consumer’s privacy could be violated. In PrivDRM, LS associates
the license with the encrypted consumer’s identity EPKLS (IDC i ) in-
stead of the original identity IDC . This encrypted consumer’s iden-
tity EPKLS (IDC i ) doesn’t reveal any information aboutCi , however
PrivDRM supports violation detection as follows. WhenO suspects
a violation, EPKLS (IDC i ) is retrieved from the license and is sent
to LS for decryption. Then, LS decrypts EPKLS (IDC i ) using own
private key and gets IDC i , which is forwarded to O . Finally, O
matches the received IDC i with a Ci and identity is revoked.
As a proof of concept, PrivDRM is implemented as an on-line
client-server service (i.e. request- respond model) in which, the
server represents an on-line DRM service for the clients (i.e. con-
sumers) to connect to using a DRM desktop application. The imple-
mentation followed the architecture shown in Figure 1. There are
two main components here: 1) the DRM host agent and 2) the DRM
client agent. The former implements the services related to the
content owner, the content distributor, and the license server. The
latter implements those services related to the consumer. The main
3The authentication process is beyond the scope of this research
Consumer Distributor License Server
auth()
Res : verify(RevocL)
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License : L
verify(L)
Figure 2: Protected Digital Content Access
consumer’s content access is illustrated in the sequence diagram in
Figure 2.
4 PRIVDRM SYSTEM ANALYSIS
Given the broad spectrum of exploitation that a DRM system could
be subject to, we will focus on the replay attacks as it is very related
to the underlying PrivDRM protocols (i.e. system design). Attacks
such as Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) are more of a network concern
than that of the application. The Denial of Service (DoS) could be
either way (i.e. network attacks and application one. It is on our list
of future work to investigate this kind of attack against PrivDRM
especially when the number of concurrent connections explodes
as we will see in our performance investigations below. The replay
attack is also known as playback attack is one of the common forms
of attacks against protocols either application or network, in which
the attacker maliciously repeats (i.e. or sometimes delay) an old
message pretending it is a fresh one. As the digital content license
could be repeated, PrivDRM is using a time-stamp to counter that.
In PrivDRM, the attackers cannot gain access to a protected content
by replay an old successful license issuing request.
PrivDRM protects against replay attacks by utilising 2 time-
stamps to verify that the License Server does not generate licenses
based on a played back requests, and the DRM client application
does not accept an old license and hence playing the content il-
legally. The first time-stamp is used when the distributor sends
the request to the license server to issue the license. The license
server is to verify the time-stamp before issuing the license. The
license itself signed by the license server containing another time-
stamp of the license server this time for the DRM application at the
consumer’s side to verify before playing the content.
It is worth noting that PrivDRM preserves the anonymity of the
consumers since no party in the system have complete information
to identify the consumer’s selections (i.e. digital contents) although
a consumer’s ID could be well-known to the distributors as well
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Figure 3: Protected Digital Content Access
as the license server (i.e. actually only H (IDi )). The by-product of
this anonymity is the prevention of collusion between parties.
The computational overhead of DRM systems affects its adop-
tion. Thus, we need to measure the run-time performance of the
various PrivDRM components. One of those components is the
one that protects the confidentiality of the content (i.e encryption).
As highlighted before, PrivDRM uses AES as its underlying cryp-
tosystem. AES is a symmetric cryptosystem that uses one key for
both encryption and decryption. Our implementation uses various
key sizes that could be configured within PrivDRM. Currently, we
support 256 bits, 512 bits, and 1024 bits key along with different
block sizes. To investigate the run-time performance of the AES
in PrivDRM, the system is used on some real files with different
sizes and the performance graph is measured as depicted in figures
3. We observe from Figure3 that AES-256 outperforms the other
the small file sizes, but when file size significantly increases, AES-
1024 outperforms the rest. We reckon the reason for this is because
the number of blocks and, hence, the required AES rounds getting
bigger with smaller key sizes and large files. Thus, privDRM takes
more time to encrypt large files with 256bit key than that of the
1024bit key using the same file size. The recommendation here
in PrivDRM is to use AES-1024 when file size is relatively large
especially with full high definition digital content, not to mention
the more security the system afford in this mode (i.e. AES-1024).
The license acquisition process represents a major component of
any DRM system including PrivDRM. Its performance significantly
affects the overall performance of any DRM solution. In PrivDRM,
we investigated the run time performance of the license acquisi-
tion process by measuring the request and response time during
the process. Generally, this is, somehow, depends on the current
network status but in this experiment, such a factor is minimised.
The license acquisition process includes two requests; the authenti-
cation request and the license request. The former should not have a
significant impact on the run-time performance of PrivDRm since
it does not include any heavy computations apart from verifying
the consumer’s ID against the revocation list. The latter is where
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Figure 4: PrivDRM: License Acquisition Run-time Perfor-
mance
[30] [23] [21] [20] PrivDRM
Initialisation 4 4 3 3 2
Name mapping process N/A N/A 4 2 N/A
During license acquisition 2 4 3 3 3
Content execution - 8 0 0 0
Revocation process 1 N/A 2 2 2
Total 7 16 12 10 7
Table 2: Processing Overhead: The Number of Messages
all heavy computation takes place such as RSA encryption, decryp-
tion, and signature generation. Figure 4 demonstrates the run-time
performance of PrivDRM in license acquisition. The numerical fig-
ures in this experiment are averaged across a different number of
consumers. The system seems to perform well when the number
of simultaneous consumers increases. This is a good indication
for scalability, which will need further investigation should that
number exceeded the 100 concurrent consumers.
Comparing PrivDRM computational cost to existing solutions
would be a good measure to evaluate PrivDRM. The comparison
should include communication overhead and consumer privacy pro-
tection requirements. Table 2 demonstrates the computational cost
comparison of PrivDRM compared to some existing DRM systems.
The computational cost is performed by computing the number
of exponential operations in the systems under comparison. The
table shows the execution of PrivDRM requires fewer exponential
operations than the other solutions in this study. One of the reasons
here is that PrivDRM does not require name mapping and/or token
set generation. Another reason which is illustrated in table 2 is the
number of messages exchanged between parties or system building
blocks. PrivDRM shows the fewer number of messages exchanged
compared to the solutions in Table 2, which, as said, contributes to
the better performance of PrivDRM over the other solutions.
To summarise, PrivDRM supports consumer anonymity, avoids
TTP utilisation, provides malicious attempts tracking, preserves
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the license acquisition process privacy, protects the servers from
collision, supports unlinkability of the content execution, provides
non-repudiation, and promotes content distributor flexibility.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper presented a solution to preserve the consumers’ pri-
vacy in multi-party DRM called Privacy-Preserving DRM System
(PrivDRM). PrivDRM allows a consumer to obtain DRM-protected
content and its license without disclosing complete personal infor-
mation, hence privacy is protected. PrivDRM, on the other hand,
holds those malicious consumers accountable for the misuse based
on the license acquired. The features of PrivDRM solution are sum-
marised as follows: a) The digital contents are distributed in a
protected form using 1024-AES encryption algorithm. b)The con-
sumer can download the protected digital content anonymously
from the distributor’s website using an anonymous connection (i.e.
TOR) without revealing originating IP-address, thus the consumer’s
anonymity is preserved during the content download process. The
consumer can submit the license request with anonymous content
ID using SHA-256 hash function instead of the original ID. The
consumer does not bear any additional cost as there is no use of
TTP or any trusted hardware. Although, the PrivDRM system sup-
ports accountability, the system applies the least privilege security
principle to achieve that. Last but not least, PrivDRM supports effi-
cient content distribution mechanism where consumers can obtain
digital content without incurring a high computational cost or high
communication overhead. The future direction of this research
focuses on Blockchain technology as an underlying technology
to preserve both user’s and content owner’s privacy. Blockchain
promises seamless transactions although power consumption for
computation restricted devices is expected to be a hurdle. This will
need comprehensive investigation which is also regarded as one of
the future directions of this research.
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